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Abstract
In this paper we investigate experimentally if people search optimally and
how price promotions in￿ uence search behavior. We implement a sequen-
tial search task with exogenous price dispersion in a baseline treatment and
introduce discounts in two experimental treatments. We ￿nd that search
behavior is roughly consistent with optimal search but also observe some dis-
count biases. If subjects don￿ t know in advance where discounts are o⁄ered
the purchase probability is increased by 19 percentage points in shops with
discounts, even after controlling for the bene￿t of the discount and for risk
preferences. If consumers know in advance where discounts are given then the
bias is only weakly signi￿cant and much smaller (7 percentage points).
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11 Introduction
Price promotions (like discounts and rebates) are ubiquitous. ￿Buy one, get one
free￿ , ￿30 percent more for the same price￿ , ￿Save four Cents per liter￿ , ￿Half price￿ ,
or ￿Happy hour" are some catch phrases we encounter every day. The persistence
of the phenomenon of price promotions suggests that it works as consumers react
with increased purchases. Per se this is not surprising at all, as any economist would
agree that for most goods (i.e. Non-Gi⁄en goods) lower prices should lead to higher
demand. Marketing research has produced a large amount of evidence though that
consumers react di⁄erently to identical discounts that are framed di⁄erently (see
the meta analysis on how discounts work by Krishna et al. 2002), which is not
consistent with standard economic theory. These ￿ndings suggests that there might
be a discount e⁄ect beyond the pure price e⁄ect, which might di⁄er depending on
how a discount is framed. Generally, the marketing literature shows that the frame
of discounts might impact on the perceived savings, the estimate of product quality,
the accuracy with which savings are calculated and the expected price distribution in
the market place (Grewal et al. 1998; Darke and Chung 2005; Inman et al. 1990;Kim
and Kramer 2006; Sinha and Smith 2000), all of which should be purchase relevant.
In this paper we use an experimental setting in order to test if there is a discount
e⁄ect, even if we exclude factors such as expected quality of the good and the believed
price distribution. In other words, is there an e⁄ect that induces humans to buy the
same good at the same net price more frequently if the price results from a discount?
Such an exercise is of interest, as it allows for a clean test if subjects actually are
prone to be exploited by discounts. The typical marketing study cannot properly
evaluate this question, as often no real purchase decisions are observed and beliefs
about the market distribution of prices for the good are not controlled for.
In our experiments we implement a standard ￿nite price-search task with and
without discounts. In a standard price-search task consumers have demand for one
unit of a good. Initially, the consumers do not know the prices di⁄erent shops charge.
They only know the over-all price distribution shop o⁄ers are drawn from. In order
to ￿nd out about the prices subjects can visit di⁄erent shops at a cost. The crucial
2decision of a shopper is to determine at which shop and at which price she stops
searching and buys the unit of the good she demands.
We employ three treatments designed to investigate the impact of discounts. In
a base line treatment subjects are engaged in the standard search task. In two other
treatments we introduce discounts. The speci￿c environments of the two discount
search tasks are guided by reality. In the Known-Discount treatment subjects
know ex-ante which of the ten shops o⁄er discounts. The real-world equivalents to
this treatment are fuel shopper dockets and discount stores. Fuel shopper dockets
(widely observed in Australia) work as follows. Shoppers receive a docket from their
supermarket (if they spend at least a certain amount on groceries), which entitles
them to a discount (typically 4 Cents) per liter of fuel if purchased at certain petrol
stations. Our treatment emulates the situation of a motorist, who has a docket and
knows which petrol stations o⁄er the discount. She does not know the actual prices
though. The treatment is also similar to the situation where a shopper knows that
there are some regular and some discount shops (such as factory outlets) but does
not know the actual prices o⁄ered.
In the second treatment with discounts (Random-Discount) the shopper does
not know if a particular shop o⁄ers a discount before visiting. The shopper knows
the probability of a shop o⁄ering a discount though. This treatment is comparable
with the real-world situation of a shopper sampling di⁄erent stores along a shop-
ping strip without any previous information. When designing our experiments we
conjectured that the impact of discounts might di⁄er across these two treatments.
A bias toward buying more often in shops o⁄ering discounts (at identical net prices)
could arise for di⁄erent reasons in the two treatments. If subjects don￿ t know where
discounts are o⁄ered they might be positively surprised once they enter a shop that
o⁄ers a discount, which could lead to a purchase impulse. In the situation where a
shopper knows where there are discounts the shops who o⁄er them might be focal
and subjects might turn down good prices on the way as they want to get to a
discount shop.
Our results are as follows. Over all, the search behavior in all treatments is
roughly consistent with expected value maximization. About 70 percent of all se-
3quences of search and purchase decisions do not violate expected value maximiza-
tion. If we allow for heterogeneous risk preferences (risk-love and aversion) then only
about ten percent of subjects clearly violate rationality. Contrary to other studies
we do not ￿nd the fraction of subjects with behavior consistent with risk-aversion
to be signi￿cantly larger than the fraction of subjects with risk-loving behavior.
There are di⁄erences across treatments with respect to decidedly irrational be-
havior. We use a multilevel mixed-e⁄ects Logit regression in order to explore these
di⁄erences. By comparing the impact of discounts on search behavior, while con-
trolling for the objective expected bene￿t from searching and discounts, heterogen-
eity in risk preferences, learning e⁄ects and demographics we can identify discount
biases. We observe the stronger discount bias in the Random-Discount treatment.
Subjects ceteris paribus are about 19 percentage points more likely to buy at a shop
o⁄ering a discount than from a shop without a discount when they do not know ex-
ante which shops o⁄er a discount. This is strong evidence that unexpected discounts
lead to a large decision bias resulting in impulsive purchases. If a consumer knows
ex-ante which shops o⁄er discounts then the e⁄ect is much smaller. The purchase
probability only increases by about 7 percentage points compared to that in a shop
without a discount. This increase is only weakly signi￿cant. Shops that are focal
as they are known to o⁄er a discount (or because shoppers own a discount voucher
for them) only have a small e⁄ect on shoppers￿propensity to buy there, once the
bene￿t from the discount is controlled for.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
related literature from search theory and experiments and motivate our approach
by looking at some marketing literature. In Section 3 we lay out the design of the
experiment and its implementation. In Section 4 we illustrate the optimal stopping
rule and the calculation of reservation prices. In Section 5 we provide our major
￿ndings. Section 6 o⁄ers a conclusion.
42 Related literature
Consumer-search theory dates back to ￿The economics of information￿ (Stigler
1961). This seminal paper is motivated by the perception that the so-called ￿law of
one price￿in a perfectly competitive market does not exist in the real world. Stigler
attributes the ubiquitous price dispersion to consumers￿costly search behavior in
a world where information asymmetry prevails. Since then, research has developed
rapidly, with the aim to describe optimal search rules in di⁄erent settings and to
apply them in more complex micro and macroeconomic models.
In conventional search models a rational and potentially risk-neutral buyer searches
for the lowest price for a certain product among dispersed prices in the market.1 The
buyers may have some knowledge of the price distribution in the market without
knowing the individual prices charged by each seller. Obtaining this speci￿c inform-
ation is costly. The main objectives of these models are to characterize the optimal
stopping rule and to predict how it changes in response to the variations of the
following major parameters:
1. Consumers￿knowledge about the prevailing price distribution. Examples for
studies with unknown price distributions are Rothschild (1974), Bikhchandani
and Sharma (1996) and Adam (2001). A model with a known price distribution
is studied in Kohn and Shavell (1974).
2. Search strategies adopted by consumers. Examples are ￿xed sample size search
(FSS; e.g., Manning and Morgan 1982), sequential search (SS; e.g., Kohn and
Shavell 1974; Bikhchandani and Sharma 1996), or variable sample size search
(VSS; e.g., Morgan and Manning 1985).2 While FSS and VSS might be more
applicable than SS in a job search scenario, SS is more realistic and hence more
popular in consumer search models. Our experiment follows this convention.
1There also exists a large literature on search theory in job-seeking scenarios (e.g., Lippman
and McCall 1976 ). However, we only focus on consumer search theory in this paper.
2Consumers can draw multiple samples simultaneously in the FSS model, whereas in SS models
they have to search one by one. As a generalization of both FSS and SS, the VSS model gives the
consumers the highest degree of ￿ exibility such that consumers search sequentially, but with the
freedom to vary the sample size from period to period.
53. The availability of recall for previously rejected price o⁄ers (e.g., Karni and
Schwartz 1977; Bikhchandani and Sharma 1996).
4. Search duration ￿in￿nite time horizon versus ￿nite time horizon.
Regardless of which of these assumptions are made, the optimal stopping rule
characterized in these papers share some general properties. Rational (and poten-
tially risk-neutral) expected utility maximizers will maximize their expected utility
when the expected net gain of one additional search is equal to the marginal search
cost. Following this optimal rule, there exists a cuto⁄reservation price, which makes
consumers indi⁄erent between accepting the lowest price available and searching fur-
ther. Consumers should keep searching until they ￿nd a price equal to or less than
this reservation price. In in￿nite time horizon settings where consumers can search
as long as they like, the reservation price is constant. Therefore, consumers never
reject a price o⁄er and go back after a few searches if every decision they make fol-
lows the optimal reservation price rule. In ￿nite time horizons, the reservation price
increases over time due to a reduced number of not-yet-uncovered o⁄ers. In general,
the reservation price increases with an increase in the cost of search and the degree
of risk aversion, or a decrease in price dispersion if the consumer is risk-averse.
Considering the popularity of search models and their frequent application in
economic modelling, it is important to know whether consumers actually search ac-
cording to the reservation price rule. Also, given the di¢ culty in gathering empirical
data on the search process, experimental studies are especially valuable.
In the earliest experimental studies, Schotter and Braunstein (1981) and Braun-
stein and Schotter (1982) investigate whether individuals in an in￿nite time horizon
search according to an optimal reservation wage rule in a job market context. They
show that the search behavior is generally consistent with the reservation-wage hy-
pothesis and responds to parameter changes (of search cost, risk preferences, price
dispersion, availability of recall, searcher￿ s knowledge of the price distribution, the
existence of a minimum wage, etc.) in the direction theory predicts.
One inconsistency observed by Schotter and Braunstein is a decreasing reserva-
tion wage, compared to the constant reservation wage predicted in an in￿nite horizon
6search model. Cox and Oaxaca (1989) suggest that this might due to the subjects￿
perception of searching in￿nitely being unrealistic. Hence they test a ￿nite time
horizon model with a maximum of 20 searches. Subjects on average search optim-
ally 77% of the time if risk-neutrality is assumed and 94% of the searches terminate
optimally according to a model allowing for risk aversion. In a follow-up experiment,
Cox and Oaxaca (1992) ask subjects to pre-commit to a reservation wage according
to which acceptances and rejections are made on their behalf. Direct tests on the
stated reservation wages reject risk-neutrality in favor of risk-aversion.
Kogut (1990; 1992) investigates consumer search behavior when the price dis-
tribution is known, in both in￿nite and ￿nite time horizons. The focus of his two
papers is on recall behavior. He ￿nds that people recall a third of the time in the
in￿nite horizon even though it is never optimal to do so. In addition, subjects stop
searching too early even if risk aversion is assumed. He attributes the substantial
under-search to the subjects not being able to ignore sunk search cost. In the ￿nite
time horizon, subjects recall roughly 30% of the time, where the amount of recall
varies with the search cost. However, Kogut concludes that the decisions made by
the subjects are still generally consistent with rational choice.3
In our paper, we adopt a sequential search model with a ￿nite time horizon as the
baseline environment. The search task we implement in the laboratory di⁄ers from
the previous experimental studies in the following aspects. First, recall is allowed to
a certain extent but leads to costs. In previous studies, recall (of previously rejected
prices) per se does not associate with any explicit cost when it is available. This
assumption could be true for Internet shopping. However, in physical markets where
sellers spread spatially, it always takes time (or transportation cost) to move from
one seller to another. In this circumstance, we believe that costly recall is a more
realistic assumption. Second, subjects are allowed to move freely both forwards and
backwards like in a real shopping scenario until the maximum number of moves is
exhausted. More speci￿cally, subjects can move forwards to a new shop or move
backwards to a previous shop. Subjects can also reverse the direction as many
3Instead of testing the optimal stopping rule, Hey (1982; 1987), Moon and Martin (1990; 1996)
and Sonnemans (1998) focus on discovering the heuristic rules used by the subjects in experimental
search tasks.
7times as they like (within the bounds of the ￿nite number of moves). The last
scenario is obviously irrational and ine¢ cient, but it is feasible and observable in
the real world. Therefore, our design realistically simulates the scenario of consumers
shopping along a road or a mall. Last, and most importantly, our focus is to ￿nd
out how discounts may bias consumer search behavior rather than to simply test the
optimal stopping rule. Moreover, as recall can only be rational in very rare cases
(, which only twice occurred in 1580 price sequences), this design provides a simple
test for clearly irrational behavior.
Our paper also relates to and shares the research question with marketing studies
on how price presentation a⁄ects consumers￿perceived savings from price promotions
and thereby in￿ uences their probability to purchase a certain product. Krishna et al.
(2002) provide a meta-analysis of 20 studies by looking at di⁄erent dimensions of
price promotion. The study shows that the buyers￿perception of the promotional
value is in￿ uenced by both price framing e⁄ects (e.g., whether a reference price is
provided) and situational e⁄ects (e.g., whether the price promotion is on a national
brand or a generic brand). For example, both absolute discounts and percentage
discounts increase consumers￿perceived savings, while percentage discounts have a
bigger impact. The typical methodology used in these studies is to survey student
subjects on their perceived savings of a particular price framing and ask them either
to rate their likelihood to purchase or to make real purchase decisions. Conclusions
are drawn by comparing the rating or the behavior of subjects across di⁄erent price
framing formats.
Typically, studies in this tradition su⁄er from lack of control. Important factors
(like buyers￿valuation, quality or attributes of the product) are usually not appro-
priately controlled for in order to allow for a clean isolation of price-framing e⁄ects.
In addition, subjects are usually asked to make hypothetical (or sometimes real) de-
cisions in isolation, whereas buyers in reality usually search for the best deal among
di⁄erent sellers under uncertainty. Our design (i.e. introducing discounts into an
experimental search environment) provides the control and incentives necessary for
a clean analysis of the e⁄ects of discounts on individuals￿purchase decisions. On
the one hand, consequences of subjects￿decisions are real, as their payo⁄ depends
8on them. On the other hand, we are able to control for subjects￿beliefs about the
quality of the good and for their beliefs about the price distribution in the market
place.
3 Experimental design
In what follows we will provide details of our experimental design and its implement-
ation. We start with the structure and parameters of the search environment. The
search task we implemented in the baseline treatment (referred to as No-Discount)
can be formally de￿ned as follows:
1. The individual is actively seeking the lowest price o⁄ered in a market, where
there are N(= 10) sellers (or shops) numbered from 1 to 10.
2. The exact price o⁄ered by each seller is not available to the buyer. However,
the buyer is informed that sellers will draw their prices randomly and inde-
pendently from the same uniform distribution with p.d.f f(p) = 1=(p ￿ p);
p = 75; and p = 175.
3. The only way to learn the price charged by particular shops is to physically
visit them in sequence. Moving from one shop to another causes costs of c = 5.
4. If the buyer moves away from a seller but later goes back to that seller then
she will ￿nd the price unchanged. In other words, recall of previously rejected
price o⁄ers is permitted.
5. Recall is also costly in this experiment, which di⁄erentiates our setting from
other commonly used search models. In the existing literature recall is either
not available or available for free. We assume that the cost of going back to
the last shop passed is the same (i.e., c) as the cost of moving from that shop
to the current one. The more shops visited after that shop, the longer is the
distance needed to travel back to it and hence the cost of recall is higher.
6. The buyer can at most make ten moves (forwards or backwards) due to some
implicit budget (or time) constraint.
97. The buyer￿ s payo⁄is equal to her valuation of the purchased product (v = 200)
less the net price paid and the total cost spent on searching and recalling (i.e.,
n ￿ c, whereas n is the total number of moves made by the individual). The
￿rst price quote is free in a standard search model, whereas it is costly in ours.
In our two experimental treatments, the search task is identical to the baseline
treatment except that some shops may o⁄er discounts to customers. Each shop in
the experimental treatments has an ex-ante probability of one-third of o⁄ering a
discount on its posted price. The discount d is equal to 15 monetary units. Draws
are independent across shops. In one treatment, the draw in a particular shop (if this
shop o⁄ers a discount) is revealed only if the buyer reaches that shop. In the other
treatment, the draws (if a discount is o⁄ered) of all ten shops are revealed before
the search process starts. We call the former the Random-Discount treatment, and
the latter the Known-Discount treatment. This design makes it possible to not only
explore the discount e⁄ect on consumer search behavior, but also to check if the
e⁄ect varies with the level of information on discounts revealed to the buyers.
In order to communicate the situation in the experimental treatments to the sub-
jects we provided the following information in addition to the common information
explaining the search task from above. Subjects in the experimental treatments were
informed that outlets are associated with one of three di⁄erent colors ￿blue, red
and green. Subjects were also informed of the color of a shopper docket they held.
Furthermore, they were told that they are entitled to a discount in all shops where
the color matches their docket. In the Known-Discount treatments subjects knew
the colors of the ten shops in advance. In the Random-Discount treatment, they
were only told that for any shop all three colors are equally likely. Subjects could
only ￿nd out if they were eligible for a discount once they had entered a particular
shop.
The search task was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and the exper-
imental sessions were conducted at AdLab, the Adelaide Laboratory for Experi-
mental Economics. In total, 158 university students participated ￿53, 57 and 48 in
the No-Discount, Random-Discount and Known-Discount treatments, respectively.
Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions and repeated participation was not
10possible. In each session, the same search task was repeated ten times with new
prices drawn randomly and independently for each subject.4
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given comprehensive written
instructions along with the opportunity to ask clarifying questions. At the end
of each session, subjects completed a computerised questionnaire, which asked for
some demographic characteristics (which we use as controls in our analysis). Ex-
perimental earnings were converted into Australian Dollars using an exchange rate
of 100 Experimental Dollars yielding 1:25 Australian Dollars. On average, subjects
earned AUD 10.20 for about 30 minutes of their time. Given that our sessions were
quite short, we conducted this experiment together with other unrelated experi-
ments, which were also incentivized by real money. A whole session lasted around
1.5 hours.
4 The optimal stopping rule
Despite the modi￿cations we made to the conventional search model, the calculation
of the optimal stopping rule still follows the same reasoning. The individual in this
search task faces a dynamic decision-making problem under uncertainty. In each
shop, the subject has to decide whether to stop and accept the current o⁄er, recall at
a previously visited shop, or keep searching (with the chance of ￿nding better prices).
The ￿rst two choices lead to certain payo⁄s, while the last choice causes uncertainty,
where the payo⁄ is drawn from a probability distribution. Therefore, an expected-
utility maximizer should compare the (expected) utilities attached to the di⁄erent
options. Whenever the expected utility given by ￿search￿exceeds the maximum
available utility from ￿stop￿or ￿recall￿ , the search should continue. Following this
principle, the optimal rule consists of a set of reservation prices containing one
at each point in the ￿nite time horizon. Whenever the actual price at a certain
point is below the reservation price the optimal decision is to stop, and to keep
searching otherwise. The reservation price increases with the number of searches
4Fixed, pre-drawn price sequences are used in some previous studies, as they can simplify the
analysis and also increase the power of statistical tests. We used random draws, as this provides
more variation. The large number of observations we have overcomes the test-power problem.
11conducted. The intuition is simple. The more prices are sampled, the less shops
with potentially low prices are left. A consumer should accept a higher price if the
likelihood of ￿nding a low price in the future is reduced.
We start with the baseline model to illustrate the optimal stopping rule for the
case of risk-neutrality. For expositional reasons we do not allow a consumer to recall
at a shop previously visited.5 Suppose a risk-neutral shopper arrives (without having
made any mistakes before) at the penultimate shop. Then the decision whether to
go to the last shop or to buy from the penultimate shop depends on wether the
pro￿t from buying V (N ￿ 1;pN￿1) is greater or smaller than the expected pro￿t
from searching EV (N ￿1): Let i 2 [1;2;:::;N] denote the location of the shop along
the street and pi denotes the price charged at shop i: A consumer is indi⁄erent if
V (N ￿ 1;pN￿1) = EV (N ￿ 1); or (1)
v ￿ pN￿1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)c =
Z p
p
(v ￿ p ￿ Nc)dF(p) (2)
The price pN￿1 solving this equation is the reservation price R(N￿1) for shop N￿1:
R(N ￿ 1) =
Z p
p
pdF(p) + c (3)
At lower prices than R(N ￿ 1) the consumer will buy and for prices higher than
R(N ￿1) the consumer will go to the last shop. For our experimental parametriza-
tion, e.g., the reservation price for the penultimate period, which is period nine, is
therefore 130; the price expectation for shop ten plus the search cost.
To ￿nd the reservation prices for earlier periods one can simply use the recursive
structure and iterate backwards. So a consumer, who arrives at shop N ￿ 2; knows
that she will accept all prices below R(N ￿ 1) but will go on searching otherwise
if she moves to shop N ￿ 1. Then taking the expectation over the pro￿ts made in
these two events gives EV (N ￿2) which can be compared to the pro￿t of buying at
5In our experimental setting recall is possible to some extent but hardly ever optimal. Only in
two out of 1580 price sequences recall was ever optimal. In priciple it is straight-forward to include
recall. The notation becomes quite messy though. The reserve prices of the optimal stopping rule
with recall do not chance signi￿cantly.
12shop N ￿ 2. The indi⁄erence condition can be used to solve for R(N ￿ 2); and so
on.
The general recursive structure for solving for the reservation prices can be writ-













V (i + 1;p)dF(p) +
Z p
R(i+1)
EV (i + 1)dF(p) (5)
The ￿rst integral of EV (i) in Equation 5 is the expected payo⁄ if the search ter-
minates in shop i + 1 weighted by the probability that this happens. The second
integral is the expected continuation value if search continues in shop i+1 weighted
by its probability of occurrence. As a result, the cuto⁄ price R(i) is a function of
all the future cuto⁄ prices. To solve for the optimal reservation price at each stage
we need to solve a series of recursive equations starting with the last shop.
The general form of the optimal stopping rule derived through the cuto⁄ prices
in equations 4 and 5 also applies to the experimental treatments where discounts
are given. The di⁄erences here are that a) whenever a discount is encountered the
prices in the equations above have to be replaced by the net prices and b) that the
expected price distributions featuring in the continuation value have to take into
account the likelihood of a discount in the Random-Discount treatment and the
known discounts in the Known-Discount treatment.
To ￿nd the optimal stopping rule we used the software Mathematica and cal-
culated the expected continuation values EV (i) and net reservation prices R(i) at
each point starting in the last period. The values for the No-Discount and Random-
Discount treatments are shown in Table 1.7 Note that the optimal stopping rule
in the treatment, where subjects in advance know the location of the shops o⁄ering
discounts depends on the actual location of shops with discounts. Given the number
6The reservation price in the last shop has to be set to p; as further search is not possible.
7Moving backwards (i.e. recall) is typically not optimal if a subject has not violated expected
value maximisation before. The only occations where moving backwards can be optimal are ex-
tremely unlikely and can only happen in period eight or nine. In our sample we observed only two
price draws out of 1580 where recall was actually optimal. For this reason recalls are ignored in
the table.
13of the discount o⁄ers and their varying locations, we observe 463 di⁄erent sequences
in the Known-Discount treatment. We calculated the optimal stopping rules for all
of these sequences but do not explicitly report them here for obvious reasons.8
No-Discount Random-Discount
i EV(i) R(i) EV(i) R(i)
1 87.667 107.334 93.384 101.616
2 82.330 107.670 88.021 101.979
3 76.828 108.172 82.485 102.515
4 71.072 108.928 76.685 103.315
5 64.918 110.082 70.475 104.525
6 58.116 111.884 63.601 106.399
7 50.194 114.806 55.582 109.418
8 40.125 119.875 45.375 114.625
9 25 130 30 125
Table 1: Expected continuation values and reservation prices.
5 Results
In this section we present our results. The most important ￿ndings are as follows.
Overall, the observed search behavior is largely consistent with the optimal behavior
under risk-neutrality. We do not observe systematic under-search patterns found in
previous studies. Subjects did exercise recall, which is typically suboptimal. The
recall rate is substantially lower than the 30% reported by Kogut (1990; 1992)
though. The introduction of discounts signi￿cantly reduces the fraction of behavior
consistent with optimal behavior under risk-neutrality. Subjects seem to be less
inclined to search further when the shop they are in o⁄ers a discount, even if the
surplus gained through the discount is controlled for by considering the net price.
This e⁄ect is much stronger if subjects do not have ex-ante information on who is
going to o⁄er a discount. In what follows we provide the details of our analysis.
We ￿rst compare actual search behavior to the optimal search strategy under risk
neutrality. Then we use a multilevel mixed-e⁄ects logistic regression to investigate
the impact of discount vouchers on search behavior.
8The optimal rules and the Mathematica code can be obtained on request from the authors.
8R(i)net is the net reservation price, namely the price minus the discount.
145.1 Comparison with the prediction under risk-neutrality
Assuming risk-neutrality, we can calculate the maximum available payo⁄ and the
expected continuation value, conditional on the prices and the discount information
given at each point of the search task. The optimal decision at each stage of the
search task, and hence the optimal search path (or duration), can be determined.
Comparing the actual behavior with the theoretically optimal behavior, we can state
our ￿rst result.
Result 1: Among the 4387 decisions made by the subjects, 85% of the decisions
are consistent with the optimal stopping rule under risk neutrality.
Observed-Buy Observed-Search Total
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Optimal 1291 29.4 2438 55.6 1662 85
Non-optimal 287 6.5 371 8.5 2725 15
Total 1578 35.9 2809 64.1 4387 100
Table 2: Actual versus optimal decisions under risk neutrality.
Table 2 provides a comparison between the observed and the optimal behavior
for every individual decision. Of the 4387 decisions made by the subjects, 1291 of
the purchase decisions and 2438 of the search decisions are optimal. In 287 decisions
when subjects stopped, a rational risk-neutral agent would have kept searching. In
the remaining 371 decisions where subjects searched, a risk-neutral searcher would
have stopped. Similar to ￿ndings in previous studies, the subjects seem to follow
the optimal stopping rule reasonably well.
Besides looking at each individual decision, we can look at a full search tasks that
include multiple decisions. The ￿rst question we ask is if a subject in a particular
search task exactly follows the search path predicted by theory. In the case that
a subject deviates from the prescribed path we can further ask if a subject keeps
searching for too long or stops too early.
Result 2: Among 1580 search tasks, subjects followed the optimal paths for
risk-neutral agents in 70.2% of tasks.
Table 3 reports the fraction of actual search paths that are optimal, or too short,
or too long. Seventy percent of observed search paths are optimal. This number
15Optimal-path Undersearch-path Oversearch-path
Base 74.9% 12.1% 14.0%
Random-D 69.6% 18.8% 11.6%
Known-D 65.6% 20.2% 14.2%
Aggregate 70.2% 17.0% 12.8%
Table 3: Observed search paths and optimal paths under risk neutrality.
is slightly lower than what is reported (77%) by Cox and Oaxaca (1989). This
di⁄erence could be due to the increased complexity induced by the provision of
discounts in the two experimental treatments. This will be further discussed in due
course. The remaining 29.8% of observations deviate from the optimal path; 17.0%
of the search paths are too short (undersearch) and 12.8% are too long (oversearch).
A common ￿nding in the literature is that subjects search too little, which is mostly
explained as risk-averse behavior. In our experiment the inconsistent behavior seems
to stem from heterogeneous risk preferences, as well as some noise in the decision-
making process. The theoretically inconsistent search patterns show a strong serial
correlation. We ￿nd one-third of the subjects always searched for too long, one-third
always searched too little, and the remaining third shows both types of inconsistency.
This is consistent with the view that two-thirds of the subjects, who deviated from
the path that maximizes expected pro￿t are not risk-neutral, while one-third made
noisy decisions. Hence, about 10% of subjects behaved noisily and in a way that is
not consistent with expected utility maximization.
Result 3: The provision of discount vouchers signi￿cantly reduces the rate of
theoretically consistent behavior. The impact of the level of information revealed to
the subjects on the rate of theoretically consistent behavior tends to be negative and
is weakly signi￿cant.
The disaggregate success rates in Table 3 show that 74.9%, 69.6% and 65.6% of
the paths exactly match the optimal paths in the No-Discount, Random-Discount
and Known-Discount treatments, respectively. Proportion tests suggest that the
success paths in both Random-Discount and Known-Discount treatments are strictly
lower than that in the base treatment (p = 0:026 and p < 0:001, respectively). The
success rate in the Known-Discount treatment is smaller and only weakly signi￿cant
16in the Random-Discount treatment (p = 0:082). Observing the composition of
inconsistent search patterns, we ￿nd a signi￿cant increase of undersearch paths in
the two experimental treatments (18.8% and 20.2% versus 12.1% in the treatment
without discounts). This suggests that discounts bias the subjects towards buying
early without appropriately considering the bene￿ts of a further search. As this
analysis cannot control for risk preferences, we will further explore this e⁄ect in the
next subsection, where we provide a proper econometric analysis.
Result 4: Subjects exercise recall in 112 (7%) cases, which is considerably less
often than in previous studies (30%).
Optimal Undersearch Oversearch Aggregate
Base 0% 21.9% 78.1% 28.6%
Random-D 2.4% 50.0% 47.6% 37.5%
Known-D 2.6% 36.9% 60.5% 33.9%
Aggregate 1.8% 37.5% 60.7% 100%
Note: Percentages are calculated based on a total of 112 recalled-paths
Table 4: A summary of search patterns where recall was excercised.
In ￿nite time horizon search tasks the reservation prices increase with the number
of shops visited, and hence recall might be optimal on some occasions. When recall
is costly as in our setting, optimal behavior rarely allows for recall. We had exactly
two price draws, where recall was optimal at one of the stages. As shown in Table 4,
on aggregate only 1.8% of the recalls are optimal, 60.7% of the recalls are observed in
oversearch and 37.5% in undersearch situations. Non-optimal recall clearly suggests
irrational behavior that might be caused by regret. The disaggregate ratios show
that most (78.1%) of the recall happened after oversearching in the base treatment,
which is consistent with regret. This percentage reduces to 47.6% and 60.5% in the
Random-Discount and Known-Discount treatments, respectively. The recall along
undersearch paths increases from 21.9% in the No-Discount treatment to 50% and
36.9% in the Random-Discount and Known-Discount treatments. The observed shift
in the composition of irrational recall behavior (i.e., oversearch-recall or undersearch-
recall) also hints at the existence of discount e⁄ects.
175.2 The impact of discounts
The analysis above suggests that there is a discount e⁄ect. For a proper test we
now turn to individual decision data. In what follows we estimate the in￿ uence of
di⁄erent variables (discounts among them) on the search decisions of individuals.
Recall that we observe the decisions of one individual in di⁄erent shops and in
di⁄erent periods. Periods here refers to the ten di⁄erent search tasks with up to ten
decisions each. We use the panel structure to control for unobserved heterogeneity
across subjects and across search tasks by allowing for random e⁄ects on these
two levels. We arrive at a multilevel mixed-e⁄ects Logit regression. The dependent
variable is binary (with 0 and 1 corresponding to ￿stop￿and ￿search￿ , respectively).9
So we estimate the probability of subject s to keep searching in the pth search task
and in shop i conditional on some covariates X:
logitfPr(searchspi = 1)g = ￿0 + ￿Xspi + ￿s + ￿sp + "spi (6)
The random e⁄ect on the subject level is denoted as ￿s and ￿sp represents the
subject-task-level random e⁄ect.
The covariates (listed below) include treatment dummies, and its interaction
with discount dummies, expected search bene￿t, search duration and individual
characteristics.
￿ No-D, Random-D, Known-D are the treatment dummies; No-D is the base
category.
￿ EBsearch is the expected net bene￿t from search. It is calculated at each de-
cision point using the expected continuation value minus the maximum avail-
able payo⁄ if a subject decided to stop there.
￿ Discount_Random-D is a dummy variable indicating that a subject is in the
Random-D treatment and a discount is o⁄ered in the current shop.
9The reason we use ￿stop￿rather than ￿buy￿is that ￿stop￿is the aggregate of both ￿buy￿and
￿recall￿decisions. The decisions after a subject has decided to go back are not included in the
regression, as recall is a clear indication for erroneous behavior.
18￿ Discount_Known-D is a dummy variable indicating that a subject is in the
Known-D treatment and a discount is o⁄ered in the current shop.
￿ i(shop) is the search duration, measured as the number of the shop the subject
has arrived at.
￿ Male is a gender dummy, which is equal to 1 for male participants.
￿ Age25￿; Age26-30 and Age31-40 is a set of dummies indicating the subjects￿
age range. Age25￿ is the base category.
￿ Maths is a dummy variable capturing whether or not a subject has a good
background in mathematics (measured as the level of high school maths that
the subject has taken), with 0 indicating a low level.
￿ Arts, Comm/Fin, Economics, Engineering, Law, Medicine, Science, and Other
are dummies which categorize subjects according to the course they are en-
rolled in. Arts is the base category; Comm/Fin is the abbreviation for Com-
merce/Finance.
Before presenting the regression results, we need to explain why this regression
allows us to identify a discount bias if it exists. Basically, our task is the following.
We want to see if a person, who gets a discount at a certain shop, is more likely to
buy there even if we control for a) the savings from the discount and b) for indi-
vidual risk preferences. Assume for instance that all subjects were expected value
maximizers as in our theoretical benchmark. Then adding the expected bene￿t from
searching (given net prices and net expected prices), which we denote by EBsearch;
as a covariate would control for the bene￿t, while heterogeneous risk preferences
would not be an issue. However, this is not enough when we have subjects with
heterogenous risk preferences. The more risk-averse a person is the lower the search
probability should be in any given situation. So we have to control for the charac-
teristics of a given situation that are relevant with respect to risk and also allow for
subjects￿heterogeneous propensity to search in general. Our subject and subject-
task-level random e⁄ects accomplish the latter. Including the expected bene￿t from
searching and also the search duration i(shop) are su¢ cient for the former.
19The inclusion of the search duration is necessary, as decision situations with
the same expected bene￿t from searching but at di⁄erent shop locations are only
equivalent for expected value maximizers but not for expected utility maximizers.
The closer a subject gets to the end of the street, the higher the risk becomes, as
there are less and less shops. Therefore, we would expect a negative impact of the
search duration on the probability of an additional search if subjects are risk-averse.
Including i(shop) controls for this.
Variable Coe¢ cient @y=@x Variable Coe¢ cient @y=@x
Constant 0.611 i(shop) -0.231*** -0.037***
(1.023) (0.060) (0.01)
Random-D* -0.165 -0.027 Maths* -0.374 -0.056
(0.386) (0.064) (0.412) (0.057)
Known-D* -0.048 -0.008 Comm/Fin* 0.037 0.006
(0.410) (0.066) (1.029) (0.163)
EBsearch 0.177*** 0.028*** Economics* 0.937 0.121
(0.010) (0.003) (1.083) (0.111)
Discount_Random-D* -0.978*** -0.190*** Engineering* 0.387 0.059
(0.232) (0.053) (1.054) (0.209)
Discount_Known-D* -0.393* -0.068 Law* -0.156 -0.026
(0.233) (0.044) (1.203) (0.209)
Male* -0.268 -0.042 Medicine* 1.063 0.128
(0.381) (0.057) (1.149) (0.099)
Age26-30* -0.907 -0.181 Science* 0.372 0.054
(1.007) (0.235) (1.130) (0.148)
Age31-40* -0.537 -0.099 Other* 0.282 0.041
(0.847) (0.175) (1.491) (0.200)
Random-e⁄ect: Group var. Estimation Std.Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
level-1 Id 1.649 (0.161) 1.361 1.997
level-2 Period 1.493 (0.193) 1.159 1.925
Log likelihood=-1341.111; Wald chi2(16) = 405.30; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
*@y=@x is for discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1; ***signi￿cant at 0.001
Table 5: Multilevel mixed-e⁄ects logistic estimation of search probabilities.
As shown in Table 5, the search probability tends to increase with the expected
bene￿t from searching. The marginal e⁄ect of EBsearch (at its mean), measured as
the change in the likelihood of a subject searching, is 0.028 for an increase by one
currency unit. This is reassuring. We also have the expected sign for the search
duration. Getting one shop closer to the end reduces the propensity to search by
4 percentage points. This hints at subjects on average being risk-averse. Other
20control variables that might explain part of the risk preferences (like age, gender
etc.) are not signi￿cant. Furthermore, we do not ￿nd any di⁄erences in search
behavior across treatments for shops without discounts, which validates our design.
We observe a large level of heterogeneity in risk preferences. The intra-class
correlation for the same subject calculates as 0:33. The correlation for choices of
the same subject in the same task is even higher with 0:6. Both correlations are
highly signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.10 On the one hand this provides a good
justi￿cation for using a multi-level model. On the other hand this shows a very high
degree of consistency of the choices of subjects across shops within tasks and still
some consistency of subjects across tasks. This suggests that subjects do not choose
randomly but follow decision rules that are in￿ uenced by risk preferences. These
decision rules change somewhat with repetition of the search task due to learning
and experience. The changes are systematic in the sense that initially more risk-
averse subject tend to stay more risk-averse than initially less risk-averse subjects.
These results above show that our empirical model is well speci￿ed. We can now
proceed to our main objective, which is to determine if there is a discount bias.
De￿ne the discount bias as the di⁄erence in the probability of a subject stopping at
a shop o⁄ering a discount compared to stopping at a shop without a discount, while
controlling for risk preferences and the expected net bene￿t from searching. Then
our regression analysis provides the following insight..
Result 5: Subjects exhibit discount biases. The bias is large (19 percentage
points) and strongly signi￿cant in the Random-D treatment but smaller (about 7
percentage points) and only weakly signi￿cant in the Known-D treatment.
The discount bias is stronger in a situation where a shopper does not know ex-
ante that a shop will o⁄er a discount. Once at a shop with a discount, the surprise
and the positive feeling of receiving a discount have a strong positive impact on
the purchase decision. The e⁄ect of discounts is relatively small when consumers
know already in advance which shops o⁄er discounts. This means that subjects are
only to a small extent prone to pass by shops with good prices, because they have
10A likelyhood-ratio test rejects the hypothesis that an ordinary logit explains the data equally
well as our mixed-level model (p < 0:0001).
21a discount voucher for a shop further down the road.
6 Conclusion
We reported on an experiment inspired by the marketing literature that shows that
discounts and the exact framing have an impact on consumers￿propensity to buy a
good. We use a consumer-search environment in order to investigate if a discount
bias exists after controlling for many aspects marketing studies do not control for.
Using a search task with discounts enabled us to ￿x the beliefs about the product
quality, induced the value of the good and held the beliefs about the price dis-
tribution in the market place constant. This design increased the level of control
compared to marketing studies considerably. Furthermore, the search environment
was made salient by using real money to incentivize subjects￿experimental search
and purchase decisions. The main result of our experiments was that even with this
high level of control a discount bias survives. In the Random-D treatment a discount
increased the purchase probability by 19 percentage points even after controlling for
bene￿ts and risk preference. We conjecture that this bias is due to positive emotions
arising from entering a shop and realizing that a discount is o⁄ered.
We found a small (about seven percent) and only weakly signi￿cant discount
e⁄ect for situations where the identity of shops o⁄ering discounts is known in ad-
vance. This suggests that the surprise e⁄ect is important for large discount biases
to exist. However, it also suggests that there might still be some (smaller) dis-
count e⁄ect that is caused by focal attraction of shops, where the consumer knows
ex-ante that she will receive a discount. It remains to be mentioned that the ex-
istence of discount biases we found does not mean that consumes behave extremely
randomly and irrationally. We found that a large majority of search and purchase
sequences in a particular search task (70.2 percent) are consistent with expected
value maximization. Allowing for heterogenous risk preferences increases the frac-
tion of rationalizable behavior even further. Only about ten percent of our subjects
made decisions that were clearly irrational.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 No-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please ensure that you read the
instructions carefully and refrain from talking or discussing the experiment with
others during the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask one of us, and
we will answer your questions individually to the best of our ability. The amount of
money you earn depends on your performance in the game. 100 points of pro￿t
in the game equates to 1.25 Australian Dollars.
You are playing a shopping game. You need to buy a certain good, which is
worth 200 points to you (your valuation of the good). Prices vary from outlet to
outlet, with the prices ranging from 75 to 175. Any price between 75 and 175 has
equal chance of occurring at any outlet you visit. You don￿ t know prices at outlets
until you visit them. There are ten outlets arranged along a line, and it costs you 5
to move from one outlet to another. You will begin at outlet 1 on the left side of the
line and begin moving to the right. You have to travel to the next outlet to learn
its price, and it will cost you 5 to discover the price at the ￿rst outlet. Once you
have moved forwards you have the option to move forwards again to a new outlet,
or backwards to a previous outlet. You have a maximum of ten moves to buy the
good.
The money you can earn is calculated by:
25Pro￿t = Valuation ￿price paid ￿(number of moves ￿ travel cost)
The game will begin at outlet 1, which will o⁄er you the chance to buy at their
price, or you can go to the next outlet for a cost of 5. At the outlet, you can choose
either ￿ buy here￿ , ￿ go to the next outlet￿ , or you can ￿ go back to the previous outlet￿ .
The price at an outlet previously visited will not change if you go back to it. The
game will ￿nish when you buy your good. If you have moved ten times and not
bought anything, you will make zero pro￿t, and the game will end. At the end of
the game you will be shown on the screen how much pro￿t you made from that
round.
The game will be played ten times, and the prices and colors of outlets are
randomly determined in each new game. Tickets cannot be kept from one game to
the next.
Thank you again for participating in our experiment, and please do not hesitate
to ask if you have any questions.
A.2 Random-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please ensure that you read the
instructions carefully and refrain from talking or discussing the experiment with
others during the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask one of us, and
we will answer your questions individually to the best of our ability. The amount of
money you earn depends on your performance in the game. 100 points of pro￿t
in the game equates to 1.25 Australian Dollars.
You are playing a shopping game. You need to buy a certain good, which is
worth 200 points to you (your valuation of the good). Prices vary from outlet to
outlet, with the prices ranging from 75 to 175. Any price between 75 and 175 has
equal chance of occurring at any outlet you visit. You don￿ t know prices at outlets
until you visit them. There are ten outlets arranged along a line, and it costs you 5
to move from one outlet to another. You will begin at outlet 1 on the left side of the
line and begin moving to the right. You have to travel to the next outlet to learn
its price, and it will cost you 5 to discover the price at the ￿rst outlet. Once you
have moved forwards you have the option to move forwards again to a new outlet,
26or backwards to a previous outlet. You have a maximum of ten moves to buy the
good.
The money you can earn is calculated by:
Pro￿t = Valuation ￿price paid ￿(number of moves ￿ travel cost)
In this game some outlets o⁄er you discounts. There are three di⁄erent color
outlets: blue, red, and green. You will start with one ticket, which you can redeem
at matching color outlet for a discount of 15 o⁄ the price of your good. You can
still buy from any outlet you ￿nd. You know that all color outlets occur with equal
chance. This means that there is a one in three chance that the next outlet will be
the same color as your ticket.
The game will begin at outlet 1, which will o⁄er you the chance to buy at their
price, or you can go to the next outlet for a cost of 5. At the outlet, you can choose
either ￿ buy here￿ , ￿ go to the next outlet￿ , or you can ￿ go back to the previous outlet￿ .
The price at an outlet previously visited will not change if you go back to it. The
game will ￿nish when you buy your good. If you have moved ten times and not
bought anything, you will make zero pro￿t, and the game will end. At the end of
the game you will be shown on the screen how much pro￿t you made from that
round.
The game will be played ten times, and the prices and colors of outlets are
randomly determined in each new game. Tickets cannot be kept from one game to
the next.
Thank you again for participating in our experiment, and please do not hesitate
to ask if you have any questions.
27A.3 Known-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please ensure that you read the
instructions carefully and refrain from talking or discussing the experiment with
others during the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask one of us, and
we will answer your questions individually to the best of our ability. The amount of
money you earn depends on your performance in the game. 100 points of pro￿t
in the game equates to 1.25 Australian Dollars.
You are playing a shopping game. You need to buy a certain good, which is
worth 200 points to you (your valuation of the good). Prices vary from outlet to
outlet, with the prices ranging from 75 to 175. Any price between 75 and 175 has
equal chance of occurring at any outlet you visit. You don￿ t know prices at outlets
until you visit them. There are ten outlets arranged along a line, and it costs you 5
to move from one outlet to another. You will begin at outlet 1 on the left side of the
line and begin moving to the right. You have to travel to the next outlet to learn
its price, and it will cost you 5 to discover the price at the ￿rst outlet. Once you
have moved forwards you have the option to move forwards again to a new outlet,
or backwards to a previous outlet. You have a maximum of ten moves to buy the
good.
The money you can earn is calculated by:
Pro￿t = Valuation ￿price paid ￿(number of moves ￿ travel cost)
In this game some outlets o⁄er you discounts. There are three di⁄erent color
outlets: blue, red, and green. You will start with one ticket, which you can redeem
at matching color outlet for a discount of 15 o⁄the price of your good. You can still
buy from any outlet. When you begin the game the computer will show a chart on
the screen displaying the color of each outlet 1 through 10.
The game will begin at outlet 1, which will o⁄er you the chance to buy at their
28price, or you can go to the next outlet for a cost of 5. At the outlet, you can choose
either ￿ buy here￿ , ￿ go to the next outlet￿ , or you can ￿ go back to the previous outlet￿ .
The price at an outlet previously visited will not change if you go back to it. The
game will ￿nish when you buy your good. If you have moved ten times and not
bought anything, you will make zero pro￿t, and the game will end. At the end of
the game you will be shown on the screen how much pro￿t you made from that
round.
The game will be played ten times, and the prices and colors of outlets are
randomly determined in each new game. Tickets cannot be kept from one game to
the next.
Thank you again for participating in our experiment, and please do not hesitate
to ask if you have any questions.
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